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We provide a characterization of when an action is rationalizable
in a binary action coordination game in terms of beliefs and higher
order beliefs. The characterization sheds light on when a global game
yields a unique outcome. In particular, we can separate those features
of the noisy information approach to global games that are important
for uniqueness from those that are merely incidental. We derive two
su¢ cient conditions for uniqueness that do not make any reference to
the relative precision of public and private signals.
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11 Introduction
Games often have many equilibria. Even when they have a single equilib-
rium, they often have many actions that are rationalizable, and are therefore
consistent with common knowledge of rationality. Yet a pathbreaking pa-
per by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) suggested a natural perturbation of
complete information that gives rise to a unique rationalizable equilibrium
for each player. They introduced the idea of ￿global games￿- where any
payo⁄s of the game are possible and each player observes the true payo⁄s
of the game with a small amount of noise. They showed - for the case
of two player two action games - that as the noise about payo⁄s become
small, there is a unique equilibrium; the equilibrium strategies played also
constitute the unique rationalizable strategies. This result has since been
generalized in a number of directions and used in a number of applications.1
When the global game approach can be applied to more general games, it can
be used to derive unique predictions in settings where the underlying com-
plete information game has multiple equilibria, making it possible to carry
out comparative static and policy analysis.
However, a number of recent papers have raised questions both on the
basic theoretical rationale for global games and the applicability of the frame-
work for the analysis of real world problems. Three strands of the argument
from the literature are particularly worthy of note.
1. In most economic environments where coordination is important, in-
teractions endogenously generate informative public information that
might be used as a coordination device. An especially important source
1Morris and Shin (1998) analyzed a global game with a continuum of players making
binary choices, and this case has been studied in a number of later applications. Morris
and Shin (2003) survey some theory and applications of global games.
2of endogenous public information are market prices (see Atkeson (2001),
Tarashev (2003), Hellwig, Mukherji and Tsyvinski (2006) and Angele-
tos and Werning (2006))2. When prices convey information, increased
precision of private information will feed increased accuracy of (endoge-
nous) public signals. Thus uniqueness conditions will fail if private
signals are su¢ ciently accurate.
2. While asymmetric information may exist in a large variety of economic
settings, it does not always conform to the global game notion of ￿noisy
signals￿ . Global game results turn on the relative precision of private
and public signals, but if we do not know what these noisy signals are
in real life, debates about relative precisions have no conceptual basis
(see, for example, Kurz (2006), Sims (2005a, 2005b), Svensson (2006),
Woodford (2005)).
3. While common knowledge of payo⁄s is relaxed in global games, there
is still assumed to be common knowledge of the information structure,
which is surely a no more realistic assumption. A recent paper by
Weinstein andYildiz (2007) shows that the exact form of the perturba-
tion away from common knowledge of payo⁄s is crucial in determining
the rationalizable outcome. The global game prediction is not the
only possible perturbation that yields unique rationalizable outcomes.
What claim does the global game approach have for being a ￿natural￿
or ￿reasonable￿perturbation?
The objective of our paper is to evaluate these arguments and questions
concerning the global game methodology, and to provide a framework that
2Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2006a, 2006b) note (inter alia) how other sources of
endogenous public information may lead to multiplicity in such coordination games.
3can both deepen our understanding of the theoretical basis for global games
and to provide guidance for applied researchers on the scope (and limitations)
of the global game approach.
The canonical information structure associated with the global game ap-
proach is one where players observe the underlying fundamental variable with
some noise. This is for the historical reason that the early papers (Carlsson
and van Damme (1993), Morris and Shin (1998)) adopted this formalism.
The noise is a convenient way to relax common knowledge of the fundamen-
tals, but in subsequent applications of global games the noisy information
structure has been taken more literally - as players failing (literally) to ob-
serve the true fundamentals perfectly. Many of the criticisms of the global
game approach presumes such a literal interpretation of the global games
approach.
However, there are pitfalls in taking the noisy information structure too
literally, as the underlying logic of the argument becomes identi￿ed with a
particular formalism, and the general scope of the approach becomes ob-
scured by debates surrounding the merits or otherwise of the particular for-
malism. The logic underlying the global game approach turns out to be
more robust, and is not tied to taking noisy signals literally.
In this paper, we revisit the belief foundations of global games. We
know already that the failure of common knowledge of the fundamentals is
a necessary condition for generating the global game outcome, but the more
demanding task is to show precisely how beliefs depart from the complete
information benchmark. We have two objectives in this paper.
First, we link the global game analysis with the earlier literature on com-
mon knowledge and interactive epistemology - to the framework popularized
by Aumann (1976) and Monderer and Samet (1989). We provide a frame-
4work that can encompass global games (especially their countable state ana-
logues) within a framework of interactive beliefs. We de￿ne an operator
on the type space that has a strong resemblance to the p-belief operator of
Monderer and Samet (1989), and show how rationalizability corresponds to
common belief in this generalized belief operator. The perspective is that of
an outside observer who observes only whether a player chooses one action
or the other. The fact that a particular action has been chosen reveals much
about the player￿ s beliefs - both about the fundamentals of the environment,
but also about the beliefs and higher order beliefs of other players. The
belief operators that we identify correspond with to the revealed strength of
beliefs that a player holds about the environment and the other players. In
this sense, we take the viewpoint of an outside observer (such as an empirical
economist) who attempts to piece together the beliefs from the action chosen.
In this way, we can characterize the higher order beliefs that underpin play
in global games, thereby answering the question of how the departure from
common knowledge is achieved in global games.
Second, the revealed beliefs approach yields insights on the question of
when there is a unique rationalizable outcome in the global game. By using
the framework of the generalized belief operators, we identify two sets of
su¢ cient conditions on the common beliefs of the types that ensure unique
rationalizability. Essentially, the property that matters is the stationarity of
beliefs with respect to the ordering of types. Global game arguments work
because the beliefs that player types have over their neighboring types do not
change abruptly as we consider types along the ordering. A special case of
such insensitivity of beliefs along the type space is the case when each type
believes he is ￿typical￿ . We show that uniqueness in the noisy information
approach to global games with public and private information uses precisely
5this strong version of insensitivity of beliefs to the order.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We begin in section 2 with
a leading example that illustrates many of the features that will make an
appearance in the general argument. We then characterize the higher order
beliefs that are necessary and su¢ cient for rationalizability, and revisit some
familiar examples of global games from the applied literature, and illustrate
our result. Section 5 then builds on earlier results to shed light on uniqueness.
We discuss two su¢ cient conditions for uniqueness that do not make reference
to noisy signals, or relative precisions of private and public signals.
2 Example
There are I players who choose from finvest, not investg. There is a cost of
investing, p 2 (0;1). The payo⁄ to investing depends on the fundamental
state ￿. There are dominance thresholds ￿ and ￿ ￿ with ￿ < ￿ ￿ such that ￿not
invest￿is dominant when ￿ falls below the lower threshold ￿ and ￿invest￿is
dominant when ￿ is above the upper threshold ￿ ￿. When ￿ < ￿, the gross
return to investing is zero irrespective of the actions of the other players, so
that investing yields a sure payo⁄ of ￿p. When ￿ > ￿ ￿, the gross return to
investing is 1 irrespective of the actions of the other players so that investing
yields a sure payo⁄ of 1 ￿ p.
When ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, the gross return to investing is 1 if and only if proportion
q or more of the players (including oneself) invest, where 0 < q < 1. The
payo⁄ matrix is
at least q invest less than q invest
invest 1 ￿ p ￿p
not invest 0 0
62.1 Reconstructing the Belief Hierarchy
For an outside observer (an empirical economist, say), the observable features
of the problem are quite coarse. The outside observer sees only whether a
player invests or not. But when combined with the knowledge of the payo⁄s
and the players￿rationality, the decision to invest reveals much about that
player￿ s beliefs - both about the fundamentals ￿, but also about the beliefs
of other players.
Suppose player i is seen to invest. Then, either i has a dominant action
to invest, or he p-believes all of the following.
1. ￿ ￿ ￿
2. proportion q or more either have a dominant action to invest or p-
believe that ￿ ￿ ￿
3. proportion q or more either have a dominant action to invest or p-
believe that [proportion q or more either have a dominant action to
invest or p-believe that ￿ ￿ ￿]
4. and so on ...
p-belief of statement 1 is a necessary condition for investing, since other-
wise the expected payo⁄ to investing is negative irrespective of the actions
of the other players. But then, other players will have reached a similar
conclusion. So, player i must also p-believe statement 2, since otherwise
there is probability less than p that proportion q or more players consider
￿invest￿as being ￿rst-order undominated. Then, fewer than q will invest.
In general, the failue to p-believe statement n + 1 is a reason not to invest,
because there is probability less than p that proportion q or more players
consider ￿invest￿as being n-th order undominated.
7In this way, unless i ￿nds it dominant to invest, p-belief of all the state-
ments in the list is necessary for ￿invest￿to be chosen. Conversely, when
a player p-believes all of the statements in the list, this is also su¢ cient for
￿invest￿to survive the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.
There is an exactly analogous hierarchy of beliefs that are revealed by a
player who chooses not to invest. Player j who does not invest reveals that
either he ￿nds it dominant not to invest, of he (1 ￿ p)-believes of all of the
following statements.
1. ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
2. proportion 1 ￿ q or more either have a dominant action not to invest
or (1 ￿ p)-believe that ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
3. proportion 1￿q or more either have a dominant action not to invest or
(1 ￿ p)-believe that [proportion 1 ￿ q or more either have a dominant
action not to invest or (1 ￿ p)-believe that ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿]
4. and so on ...
These statements are individually necessary and jointly su¢ cient for ￿not
invest￿to survive the iterated deletion of interim dominated strategies.
2.2 Information Structure
To explore when one or other action may be supported as an iteratively
undominated action, we introduce an information structure. Suppose ￿
takes realizations in the set of integers Z = f￿￿￿ ;￿2 ￿ 1;0;1;2;3;￿￿￿g and
there is a prior density ￿ over Z. There are I = 2n+1 players who play the
investment game.
8The players receive noisy signals concerning ￿. Let si be player i￿ s signal
realization. si takes values in Z. Conditional on ￿, player i is equally likely
to observe any signal between ￿￿n to ￿+n, but we depart from the familiar
global game assumption that players￿signals are independent conditional on
￿. The purpose of this departure is to construct an information structure
that is as close as possible in spirit to the continuum player global game, as
we will elaborate below. Conditional on ￿, each signal realization between
￿ ￿n and ￿ +n is observed by precisely one player. No two players observe
the same signal, and each possible realization between ￿ ￿ n and ￿ + n is
observed by some player.
One way in which our information structure could be generated is through
the following procedure. Conditional on ￿, a player is selected randomly to
receive the highest signal (namely ￿ + n). Each player has equal chance
of being selected. Next, the second highest signal realization, ￿ + n ￿ 1
is given to a player chosen from the remaining pool of players, where each
player has equal chance of being selected, and so on. Once the ranking has
been chosen (unknown to the players themselves), each player observes his
signal, and makes inferences based on this signal. The information structure
arrived at in this way has the following two features.
￿ Any two players can be strictly ranked according to their signal real-
izations.
￿ Conditional on ￿, player i has equal chance of observing any signal
realization between ￿ ￿ n and ￿ + n.
Conditional on observing signal realization si, player i￿ s posterior density









0 in the support. Among other things, this means that the posterior
densities can be ranked by ￿rst-degree stochastic dominance.
We can trace a player￿ s beliefs about his rank in the population, as mea-
sured by the realization of his signal relative to those of others. Player i
with signal si has the highest signal realization when ￿ = si￿n. So, player i
believes he has the highest signal with probability ￿(si ￿ n j si). In general,
player i with signal si believes that he has the k + 1-th highest signal in the
population with probability ￿(si ￿ n + k j si). Let ￿k (si) be the probabil-
ity that player i assigns to there being k ￿ 1 players with signals lower than
himself, conditional on signal si. Then ￿k (si) = ￿(si + n ￿ k + 1 j si). Let
￿(si) ￿ (￿1 (si);￿2 (si);￿￿￿ ;￿I (si))
be the pro￿le of i￿ s beliefs over his rank order, conditional on si.
2.3 Evident Events
For the next step, see ￿gure 1. Fix ^ ￿, and let ^ s be the highest signal
realization such that proportion q or more of players have signal realizations
that are ^ s or higher at ^ ￿. Denote by ^ p the probability that ￿ ￿ ^ ￿ conditional
on ^ s. We then have:
1. When ￿ ￿ ^ ￿, proportion q or more players receive signal ^ s or higher.
This follows from the ￿rst-degree stochastic dominance of signal real-
izations as ￿ increases.
2. When si ￿ ^ s, player i ^ p-believes that ￿ ￿ ^ ￿. This follows from the
￿rst-degree stochastic dominance of the posterior density over ￿ as si
increases.





q ˆ s ˆ
Figure 1: Evident events
So, when ￿ ￿ ^ ￿, proportion q or more of the players ^ p-believe that ￿ ￿ ^ ￿.
We say that the event
n
￿j￿ ￿ ^ ￿
o
is (q; ^ p)-evident when this holds. Our de-
￿nition generalizes Monderer and Samet￿ s (1989) notion of p-evident events,
where we keep track of the proportion q of players who p-believe an event.
Suppose now that ^ ￿ ￿ ￿, and that player i ^ p-believes
n
￿j￿ ￿ ^ ￿
o
. Then
he ^ p-believes all of the following:
1. ￿ ￿ ￿
2. proportion q or more ^ p-believe that ￿ ￿ ￿
3. proportion q or more ^ p-believe that [proportion q or more ^ p-believe that
￿ ￿ ￿]
4. ￿￿￿
Say that there is common (q;p)-belief that ￿ ￿ ￿ when this list holds.
From the list of statements in section 2.1, ￿invest￿is rationalizable for i if















Figure 2: Case when ^ p ￿ p and ^ r ￿ 1 ￿ p
if ^ p ￿ p. This is because when player i has a dominant action to invest,
he ^ p-believes that ￿ ￿ ^ ￿. So, the ￿either-or￿clause concerning dominant
action types is subsumed under the ^ p-belief of
n
￿j￿ ￿ ^ ￿
o
. Since our space
of signals and fundamentals is countable, common (q;p)-belief implies the
existence of a (q;p)-evident event, since otherwise the countable intersection
of events satisfying each clause yields the empty event. Following an exactly
analogous line of reasoning for when ￿not invest￿is rationalizable, we have:
Claim 1 ￿Invest￿is rationalizable for i if and only if i p-believes some (q;p)-
evident subset of f￿j￿ ￿ ￿g. ￿Not invest￿is rationalizable for i if and only
if i (1 ￿ p)-believes some (1 ￿ q;1 ￿ p)-evident subset of
￿
￿j￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
.
Figure 2 illustrates a case when both actions may be rationalizable. When
^ p ￿ p and ^ r ￿ 1 ￿ p, the event f￿j￿ ￿ ￿g is (q;p)-evident, and
￿
￿j￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
is (1 ￿ q;1 ￿ p)-evident. Unique rationalizability rests on ruling out such
cases.
2.4 Uniqueness
Consider the rank pro￿les ￿(si) and ￿(s0
i) at two di⁄erent signal realizations
si and s0
i. Write ￿(s0
i) D ￿(si) when ￿(s0
i) weakly dominates ￿(si) in the
12q
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Figure 3: Decreasing rank beliefs
sense of ￿rst degree stochastic dominance. Say that rank beliefs are weakly
increasing in signals when s0
i ￿ si implies ￿(s0
i) D ￿(si).
Let s and ￿ s be signal realizations illustrated in ￿gure 2. s is the highest
signal such that at ￿, proportion q or more have signal s or higher. ￿ s is the
lowest signal such that at ￿ ￿, 1 ￿ q or more have signal ￿ s or lower.
We then have the following su¢ cient condition for uniqueness.
Claim 2 If rank beliefs are weakly decreasing in signals in fsi j s ￿ si ￿ ￿ sg,
then there is a unique rationalizable outcome in the investment game, except
possibly at one value of ￿.
When rank beliefs are weakly decreasing in signals, a player believes that
his rank is low when he receives a high signal. Suppose that a student ￿nds
out that his test score is high, and what matters is just his relative ranking
in the class. Is the high score good news or bad news? When rank beliefs
are decreasing in signals, this is bad news. The fact that he has received a
high score indicates that the test must have been very easy, so that others
have received even higher scores. Such beliefs correspond to priors that are
locally U-shaped, such as that illustrated in ￿gure 3.
13Let ^ p(￿) be the largest probability h with which f￿
0j￿
0 ￿ ￿g is common
(q;h)-belief. When rank beliefs are weakly decreasing, ^ p(￿) is increasing in ￿.
If ^ p(￿) < p for all ￿ in the undominated region, then there is no (q;p)-evident
subevent of f￿j￿ ￿ ￿g. Thus, suppose ^ p(￿) ￿ p above some threshold ￿
￿.
Then, f￿j￿ ￿ ￿
￿g is common (q;p)-belief at all ￿ ￿ ￿
￿, but f￿j￿ ￿ ￿
￿g is not
(1 ￿ q;1 ￿ p)-belief at all ￿ < ￿
￿. Below the threshold ￿
￿, f￿j￿ ￿ ￿
￿g is not
common (q;p)-belief , but f￿j￿ ￿ ￿
￿g is (1 ￿ q;1 ￿ p)-belief. At ￿
￿ itself,
both actions may be rationalizable, but this is due to the probability atom
on ￿
￿ arising from the fact that ￿ is drawn from a discrete space. Otherwise,
there is a unique rationalizable outcome.
We note the following corollaries, bearing in mind that the results hold
except possibly at one value of ￿.
Corollary 3 If ￿(￿) is a constant function over fsi j s ￿ si ￿ ￿ sg, then there
is a unique rationalizable outcome in the investment game.
For instance, ￿(￿) would be constant over fsi j s ￿ si ￿ ￿ sg if the prior ￿
is a geometric density over the relevant interval, so that ￿(￿)=￿(￿ + 1) =
￿(￿ + j)=￿(￿ + j + 1).
Also, although we have conducted the discussion with a common prior
￿, our argument could easily be extended for the case where players hold
di⁄erent priors over ￿. Izmalkov and Yildiz (2006) examine an information
structure where some players are systematically more optimistic than others.
Our framework could accommodate such information structures.
An even more restrictive special case is when ￿ is not only constant over










14If (1) holds, player i believes he has equal probability of being ranked any-
where in the population. Player i believes that he is ￿typical￿ in quite
a strong sense. The uniqueness result for continuum action global games
with Gaussian fundamentals and signals rests of approaching the analogue
of (1). When ￿(si) is uniform, we can characterize the unique rationalizable
outcome crisply.







whenever s ￿ si ￿ ￿ s. Then,
￿invest￿ is the unique rationalizable action in the ￿rst-order undominated
region when p + q < 1. ￿Not invest￿is the unique rationalizable action in
the ￿rst-order undominated region when p + q > 1.
The corollary follows from the fact that when ￿ uniform, ^ p = 1 ￿ q.
￿Invest￿is rationalizable when ^ p > p. That is, when p + q < 1. ￿Not
Invest￿is rationalizable when 1 ￿ ^ p > 1 ￿ p. That is, when p + q > 1.
2.5 Comparison to Gaussian Information Structures
Given the importance of rank order beliefs, let us retrace what the analogous
rank order beliefs are in the familiar Gaussian information structure that is
commonly used in continuum player global games. Player i￿ s private signal
is given by
xi = ￿ + "i
where ￿ is a Gaussian random variable with mean y and variance 1=￿, and
"i is Gaussian with mean zero and variance 1=￿. The random variables f"ig
are mutually independent, and independent of ￿.
Denote by ￿(x) the proportion of players whose signal is x or less. The
￿￿￿stands for ￿lower￿ . Then, ￿(x) is a random variable with realizations in
the unit interval, and which is a function of the random variables f￿;"igi2[0;1]
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Figure 4: Deriving G(zjxi)
and the threshold x. We derive the density function of ￿(xi) conditional on
xi. Let
G(zjxi) (2)
be the cumulative distribution function of ￿(xi) conditional on xi, evaluated
at z. In other words,
G(zjxi) = Pr(￿(xi) ￿ zjxi) (3)
so that, G(zjxi) is the probability that the proportion of players with signal
lower than xi is z or less, conditional on xi. Figure 4 illustrates the derivation
of G(zjxi).
Given ￿, the proportion of players who have signal below xi is
￿
￿p
￿ (xi ￿ ￿)
￿
(4)
where ￿(￿) is the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal.
Let ^ ￿ be the realization of ￿ at which this proportion is exactly z. In other
16words,





The top panel of ￿gure 4 illustrates ^ ￿. When ￿ ￿ ^ ￿, the proportion of players
that have signal below xi is z or less. In other words, ￿(xi) ￿ z whenever
￿ ￿ ^ ￿. Hence, G(zjxi) is the probability of
n
￿j￿ ￿ ^ ￿
o
conditional on xi.
The bottom panel of ￿gure 4 illustrates the argument. Conditional on xi,




and precision ￿ + ￿. The probability that ￿ ￿ ^ ￿ is the area under this










This expression gives G(zjx). Substituting out ^ ￿ by using (5) and re-



















so that G is the identity function. In other words, the c.d.f. of ￿(xi) is
the 45 degree line, and hence the density over ￿(xi) is uniform. Thus, in
this limit, player i believes that he is ￿typical￿in quite a strong sense, in
that he puts equal weight on every realization of ￿(xi). In this sense, the
uniform density over ￿ is exactly analogous to the rank belief pro￿le ￿(:)
being uniform.
173 Common Belief in Global Games
We now generalize our argument of the previous section. In so doing, we
characterize the hierarchy of beliefs that underpin actions in global games.
We will also apply these insights in considering the hierarchy of beliefs that
ensure a unique rationalizable outcome in the global game.
3.1 Setting
There are I players, I =f1;2;:::;Ig and a countable set of payo⁄ states, ￿.
A type space is a collection T = (Ti;￿i)
I
i=1, where Ti is the set of types of
player i and ￿i : Ti ! ￿(T￿i ￿ ￿). We consider binary action games, where
each player i will choose ai 2 f0;1g. We write ￿i (Z;￿) for the payo⁄ gain
to player i of choosing action 1 over choosing action 0 if Z ￿ I n fig is the
set of his opponents who choose action 1 and the payo⁄ state is ￿. In other
words, if ui (a;￿) were player i￿ s payo⁄ if action pro￿le a is chosen and state
is ￿, the function ￿i is de￿ned as
￿i (fj 6= ijaj = 1g;￿) = ui (1;a￿i;￿) ￿ ui (0;a￿i;￿).
Thus a game is parameterized by payo⁄s ￿ =(￿1;::;￿I). Throughout the
paper, we will consider supermodular games which in this context means:
Assumption. (Supermodularity) ￿i (Z;￿) is increasing in Z, i.e., Z ￿ Z0 )
￿i (Z;￿) ￿ ￿i (Z0;￿)
3.2 Product Events
The relevant state space for our problem is ￿ = T1 ￿ T2 ￿ ::: ￿ TI ￿ ￿ and
an event would ordinarily be de￿ned as a subset of ￿. However, we will be
interested in a special class of product events corresponding to each player
18i￿ s type ti belonging to a subset Fi ￿ Ti. Thus a product event is a vector




2Ti. We will be highlighting two interpretations of
product events.
First, a product event F uniquely de￿nes an equivalent ordinary event
XF ￿ ￿ with
XF = f(t1;:::;tI;￿) 2 ￿jti 2 Fi for each i = 1;:::;Ig.
Where no confusion arises, we will identify a product event F with its equiv-
alent ordinary event XF. In keeping with this interpretation, we will write
t 2 F if ti 2 Fi for each i = 1;:::;I and we will de￿ne a natural partial order
on product events by set inclusion, so F ￿ E if Fi ￿ Ei for each i = 1;::;I.
Second, because we are focussing on binary action games, the set of prod-
uct events is isomorphic to the set of strategy pro￿les. Thus we can identify
the product event F with the strategy pro￿le where player i chooses action
1 if and only if ti 2 Fi.
Denote by S the class of product events. Now S is a complete lattice
under the partial order ￿ and the join E _ F and meet E ^ F of a pair of
events E and F are de￿ned as
E _ F ￿ (Ei [ Fi)
I
i=1







I times z }| {
?;::;?
1
A and T = (T1;:::;TI)
for the smallest and largest elements of S, respectively.
Notice that the meet operation corresponds to intersection of the equiv-
alent ordinary events, i.e.,
XE^F = XE \ XF
19and that the (set inclusion) ordering on product events generates the same
ordering as set inclusion on their equivalent ordinary events, i.e.,
F ￿ E if and only if XF ￿ XE.
There is also a natural de￿nition of the negation of an event, :F, with
:F = :(Fi)
I
i=1 ￿ (v Fi)
I
i=1 .
Now the class of product events is closed under f_;^;:g. The de￿nitions
of join can be extended to any countable collection of simple events in the
natural way, and we will appeal to these de￿nitions later. Also, we note the
following properties of these operations.
::F = F; :; = T; :T = ;
:(E _ F) = :E \ :F
3.3 Generalized Belief Operators
We will de￿ne player i￿ s ￿i-belief function B
￿i
i : S ! 2Ti as follows. Let
ZF;i (t) be the set of players other than i such that tj 2 Fj; thus ZF;i : T ! 2I
is de￿ned as
ZF;i (t1;￿￿￿ ;tI) = fj 2 I j j 6= i and tj 2 Fjg.









i (F) = fti 2 Fi jEti (￿i (ZF;i;￿)) ￿ 0g,
20Thus B
￿i
i (F) is player i￿ s best response to the strategy pro￿le F, since
ti 2 B
￿i
i (F) exactly if action 1 is a best response for player i if he thinks each
opponent j chooses action 1 only if tj 2 Tj. We dub B
￿i
i a "belief function"
because ti 2 B
￿i
i (F) reveals that type ti puts su¢ ciently high probability on
some or all of his opponents having types tj 2 Tj. The more likely is F,
the greater is player i￿ s incentive to play action 1 himself. Hence, his taking
action 1 reveals that he places high weight on F.









B￿ (F) identi￿es the set of type pro￿les for whom playing 1 is a best reply
when other players play 1 on event F; equivalently, it is the set of types with
high beliefs that F is true.
The generalized belief operator B￿ : S ! S satis￿es the following prop-
erties:
B1. F ￿ F 0 ) B￿ (F) ￿ B￿ (F 0)
B2. B￿ (F) ￿ F for all F
B3. If F n is a decreasing sequence, then B￿ (^nF n) = ^nB￿ (F n).
B4.
￿
B￿￿n (F) is a decreasing sequence
B1 states that B￿ is an increasing operator on the lattice S; it is an im-
plication of supermodularity, and shows that our interpretation of ￿revealed
beliefs￿is consistent with the deductive closure of beliefs. That is, if F im-
plies F 0, then belief in F implies belief in F 0. B2 follows from the de￿nition.
B3 is a continuity axiom: it is implied by B1 if the type space is ￿nite. In
B4,
￿
B￿￿k denotes the k-fold application of the B￿ operator. B4 follows
from B1 and B2.
21De￿nition 5 Event F is ￿-evident if it is a ￿xed point of B￿, i.e.,
F = B
￿ (F)
By B2, this is equivalent to the requirement that F ￿ B￿ (F). Note that
event F is ￿-evident if and only if the strategy pro￿le F is an equilibrium of
the incomplete information game (where indi⁄erent types choose action 1).
De￿nition 6 Event C￿ (F) is the largest ￿-evident contained in F, so (by
B1)
C






If t 2 C￿ (F), we say that there is common ￿-belief at t. At t, everyone
￿-believes F, everyone ￿-believes that everyone ￿-believes F, and so on.
These de￿nitions parallel de￿nitions in the formal economics literature on
common beliefs, and we can use them to report a ￿xed point characterization
of common ￿-belief in the manner of Aumann (1976) and Monderer and
Samet (1989):
Proposition 7 Event F is common ￿-belief at t if and only if there exists
a ￿-evident event F 0 such that t 2 F 0 ￿ F;
Proof. For the ￿ if￿direction, note that since F 0 is ￿-evident, we have F 0 ￿
B￿ (F 0) ￿ B￿ ￿
B￿ (F 0)
￿
￿ ￿￿￿. From property B1, we then have F 0 ￿ F ￿
B ￿ (F) ￿ B￿ ￿
B￿ (F)
￿
￿ ￿￿￿. Hence, F is ￿-evident at t. For the ￿ only




that C￿ (F) is ￿-evident.
Lemma 8 C￿ (T) is the largest ￿-evident event, i.e., if F 0 is ￿-evident then
F 0 ￿ T.
22This lemma shows that C￿ (T) is the equilibrium of the incomplete in-
formation game where action 1 is played the most. It is therefore a very
special case of the observation of Vives (1990) that the largest equilibrium
of a supermodular game can be found looking at the limit of best response
dynamics starting at the largest strategy pro￿le.
3.4 Characterizing Rationalizability
We now characterize rationalizable strategy pro￿les in terms of our general-
ized belief operators, in the analogous way that we characterized rational-
izable strategies in our leading example of the investment game. We ￿rst
de￿ne rationalizable actions as follows.
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This corresponds to the de￿nition of ￿interim correlated rationalizability￿
in Dekel, Fudenberg and Morris [DFM] (2007), who gave a formal epistemic
argument that the interim correlated rationalizable actions are exactly those
that are consistent with common knowledge of rationality and a type￿ s higher
order beliefs about ￿. They also show that there is the standard equivalence
between (correlated) rationalizability and iterated dominance. An action is
interim correlated rationalizable if and only if it survives iterated deletion
23of strictly interim dominated strategies (claim 1). The "correlation" in the
de￿nition arises because a player￿ s type is allowed to have any - perhaps cor-
related - beliefs over others￿actions, types and payo⁄ states ￿ as long as he
puts probability 1 on others￿actions being rationalizable for their types (part
(1) of the de￿nition) and his beliefs are consistent with that type￿ s beliefs
about others types and payo⁄ state. The alternative "interim independent
rationalizability" solution concept discussed in DFM puts conditional inde-
pendence restrictions on those beliefs. However, there will not be a di⁄erence
between the ex and interim solution concepts in this environment because su-
permodularity will ensure that the critical conditional beliefs over opponents￿
actions will be point beliefs.
Now we have our characterization of rationalizable actions.
Proposition 10 Action 1 is rationalizable for type ti if and only if ti 2
C ￿
i (T).
Recall that a product event F can be understood as a strategy pro￿le,
where Fi is the set of types of player i. The operator B is then the best
response map on strategy pro￿les. Now T corresponds to the largest strat-
egy pro￿le and C￿ (T) is the strategy pro￿le that arises in the limit when
we iteratively apply the best response function. Thus the above proposition
re￿ ects the well known fact that best response dynamics starting with the
largest strategy pro￿le converges to the largest equilibrium in an incomplete
information game with supermodular payo⁄s (Vives (1990)) and the largest
equilibrium also correspondence to the largest rationalizable strategy pro￿le
(Milgrom and Roberts (1991)). As noted above, the di⁄erence between ex
ante and interim rationalizability will not matter in this setting. For com-
pleteness, we will report a direct argument for the proposition which high-
24lights the "infection argument" logic from the higher order beliefs literature
and introduces some techniques we will appear to later.
Proof. In proving this result, it is insightful to introduce a dual operator to
the B￿ operator. For any product event F, de￿ne S￿ (F) as
S
￿ (F) ￿ :B
￿ (:F) (9)





















is the set of player i￿ s types for whom action 1 is a best reply







is the set of player i￿ s types who strictly prefer to play action 0 when player
j plays action 0 on Fj, for all j 6= i. Thus, S￿ (F) is the set of type pro￿les
who strictly prefer to play action 0 when action zero is played on F. Note
that S￿ (F) is a simple event, when F is a simple event.
In particular, when F = ;, the event S￿ (;) consists of the type pro￿les
for whom playing action 0 is strictly dominant. This is so, since the these







consists of type pro￿les who strictly prefer to play action 0 when all type
pro￿les in S￿ (;) play action 0. In other words, S￿ ￿
S￿ (;)
￿
is the set of
type pro￿les who strictly prefer action 0 when faced with types who do not





25is the set of type pro￿les who strictly prefer action 0 when faced with types







is the simple event consisting of type pro￿les who strictly prefer to play action
0 after the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. Thus, action
1 is rationalizable for player i if only if action 1 is a best reply when other
types play action 1 in the negation of (10). That is, action 1 is rationalizable








































This proves the proposition.
Naturally, we can carry out an exactly analogous analysis for action 0.
De￿ne e ￿i be
e ￿i (Z;￿) = ￿￿i (I n (Z [ fig)).
Then we have




Say that dominance solvability holds if R￿
i ( ￿;ti) = f0g or f1g for all i
and ti.
Corollary 12 There is a unique rationalizable action for each type if and
only if C￿ (T) = :C
e ￿ (T).
264 Characterizing Belief Hierarchies
We are now in a position to utilize our result on rationalizability to charac-
terize the belief hierarchies of players in a global game. We take the point
of view of an outside observer. We have just observed a player taking action
1. What can we infer from the action about the beliefs of the player? We
illustrate the scope of the generalized belief operator by listing a number
of examples of global games, some of which have received attention in the
applied literature in ￿nancial economics and macroeconomics.
We start with our leading example, discussed in an earlier section.
Investment Game Revisited
When ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, then successful coordination is possible only if proportion
q or more invest. The cost of investing is p 2 (0;1), and the gross return to





1 ￿ p if ￿ > ￿ ￿
1 ￿ p, if
#Z+1
I ￿ q and ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿p, otherwise
From our proposition on rationalizability, ￿invest￿ is rationalizable for a
player if and only if the player p-believes all of the following
1. ￿ ￿ ￿
2. ￿ ￿ ￿ or proportion at least q p-believe that ￿ ￿ 0
3. ￿ ￿ ￿ or proportion at least q p-believe that [￿ ￿ ￿ or proportion at
least q p-believes that ￿ ￿ 0]
4. and so on...
27￿Regime Change￿Game
There is a cost of investing of p 2 (0;1). The gross return to investing is 1
if proportion investing is at least f (￿), and it is 0 otherwise. The payo⁄ to
not investing is 0. These are the payo⁄s in Morris and Shin￿ s (1998) paper




1 ￿ p, if
#Z+1
I ￿ f (￿)
￿p, otherwise
Coordination is successful only if the proportion investing is least f (￿), where
f is a non-increasing function of the fundamentals ￿.
Assume that f (￿) > 1 if and only if ￿ < 0. In this case, Invest is
a rationalizable action for a player if and only if he p-believes all of the
following.
1. ￿ ￿ 0
2. the proportion of players who p-believe that ￿ ￿ 0 is at least f (￿)
3. the proportion of players who p-believe that [the proportion of players
who p-believe that ￿ ￿ 0 at least f (￿)] is at least f (￿)
4. and so on....
Linear ￿Regime Change￿Game
This is the special case of the regime change game where
f (￿) = 1 ￿ ￿.
Thus, the gross return to investing is 1 if proportion investing is at least 1￿￿,
and it is 0 otherwise. The payo⁄ to not investing is 0. The ￿i function
28corresponding to these payo⁄s is
￿i (Z;￿) =
￿
1 ￿ p, if
#Z+1
I ￿ 1 ￿ ￿
￿p, otherwise
These payo⁄s have become the canonical global game payo⁄ structure in
recent papers, such as Dasgupta (2001), Metz (2002), Angeletos, Hellwig and
Pavan (2006, 2007), and others.3
For the linear regime change game, invest is a rationalizable action for a
player if and only if he p-believes all of the following.
1. ￿ ￿ 0
2. the proportion of players who p-believe that ￿ ￿ 0 is at least 1 ￿ ￿
3. the proportion of players who p-believe [the proportion of players who
p-believe that ￿ ￿ 0 at least 1 ￿ ￿] is at least 1 ￿ ￿
4. and so on....
Linear Payo⁄ Game
Payo⁄to invest is ￿￿l, where l is the proportion of opponents not investing.
Payo⁄ to not invest is 0.
￿i (Z;￿) = ￿ ￿ 1 +
#Z
I ￿ 1
These payo⁄s were examined by Morris and Shin (2001, 2003), and has
￿gured in applied papers such as Plantin, Sapra and Shin (2005). Invest is
rationalizable for player 1 only if all of the following hold.
1. player 1￿ s expectation of ￿ is at least 0, i.e., E1 (￿) ￿ 0
3Morris and Shin introduced these payo⁄s in their 1999 invited lecture at the Econo-
metric Society European meetings in Santiago de Compostella, eventually published as
Morris and Shin (2004).
292. player 1￿ s expectation of ￿ is at least one minus player 1￿ s expectation of
the proportion of others with expectation of ￿ at least 0, i.e., E1 (￿) ￿
1 ￿ Pr1 (E2 (￿) ￿ 0)
3. player 1￿ s expecation of ￿ is at least one minus player 1￿ s expectations
of the proportion of others with expectation of ￿ at least one minus
others￿expectation of the proportion of others with expectation of ￿ at
least 0
4. and so on ...
The two person version of this game has an especially simple structure.
The payo⁄ function is
Invest Not Invest
Invest ￿;￿ ￿ ￿ 1;0
Not Invest 0;￿ ￿ 1 0;0
Then invest is rationalizable for player 1 if and only if all of the following
hold.
1. player 1￿ s expectation of ￿ is at least 0, i.e., E1 (￿) ￿ 0
2. player 1￿ s expectation of ￿ is at least one minus player 1￿ s proba-
bility that player 2￿ s expectation of ￿ is at least 0, i.e., E1 (￿) ￿
1 ￿ Pr1 (E2 (￿) ￿ 0)
3. player 1￿ s expecation of ￿ is at least one minus player 1￿ s probability
that player 2￿ s probability that player 1￿ s expectation of ￿ is at least 0,
i.e., E1 (￿) ￿ 1 ￿ Pr1 (E2 (￿) ￿ 1 ￿ Pr2 (E1 (￿) ￿ 0))
4. and so on ...
30Contribution Game
The public good contribution game is a ￿private values￿version of a global
game. Let ￿ ￿ RI. The cost of investing is ￿￿i. The return to investing






￿i ￿ 1, otherwise
In this context, invest is rationalizable for player 1 only if all of the
following hold.
1. player 1￿ s expectation of ￿1 is at least 0, e.g., E1 (￿1) ￿ 0
2. player 1￿ s expectation of ￿1 is at least one minus player 1￿ s probability
that the proportion of others with expectation of ￿i at least 0 is at least
￿.
3. and so on ...
5 Uniqueness
We now turn our attention to su¢ cient conditions for dominance solvability.
The perspective of common belief gives us new insights into the properties
belief hierarchies that yield uniqueness. We report on two su¢ cient condi-
tions for uniqueness. We begin with the common certainty of rank beliefs.
5.1 Common Certainty of Rank Beliefs
Common certainty of rank beliefs relies on a large degree of symmetry in
the game, and has considerable a¢ nity with many uses of global games seen
in the applied literature. The argument for uniqueness is a generalization
31of the argument we gave for the example of the investment game given in
section 2.
Payo⁄s ￿ are separable-symmetric if there exist a non-decreasing function
g : f0;1;::;I ￿ 1g ! R and a function h : ￿ ! R such that
￿i (Z;￿) = g (#Z) + h(￿)
for all i = 1;::;I, Z ￿ I=fig and ￿ 2 ￿. We will maintain this assumption
throughout this section. With separable-symmetric payo⁄s, a type ti 2 Ti




￿i (ti)[t￿i;￿]h(￿) > 0;
and a type ti 2 Ti has a strictly dominant strategy to choose action 0 if
g (I ￿ 1) +
X
t￿i;￿
￿i (ti)[t￿i;￿]h(￿) < 0.
Limit dominance is satis￿ed if there exists at least one type of one player
with a strictly dominant strategy to choose action 1 and at least one type of
one player with a strictly dominant strategy to choose action 0. A type is
said to be strategic if neither action is strictly dominant for that type.
We introduce the following complete order on the union of all types,
T[ = [I
i=1Ti:







In other words, each type is ordered by his beliefs on the fundamentals ￿.
High types are those that have high expectations of fundamentals. Now let




￿i (ti)[f(t￿i;￿)j#fj 6= ijtj ￿ tigg = k ￿ 1].
32Now ￿i (ti)[k] is the probability that player i attaches to there being exactly
k ￿ 1 players￿having a lower expectation of ￿. De￿ne
￿i (ti) ￿ (￿i (ti)[1];￿i (ti)[2];￿￿￿ ;￿i (ti)[I])
as the mapping that associates with each type the density over possible ranks
for that player. Constant common rank beliefs of strategic types is satis￿ed
if there exists r￿ 2 ￿(f0;:::;I ￿ 1g) such that for each player i and each
strategic type ti 2 Ti, ￿i (ti) = r￿.
Finally, we will use three "technical" assumptions. We label them tech-
nical assumptions because they satis￿ed for free in the standard continuous
signal global game environment with smooth densities. One merit of our
discrete formulation is that it forces us to make explicit assumptions that
are implicit in the standard formulation.























￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ "
￿
In other words, if one type of a player has a higher expectation of ￿ than
another, the di⁄erence exceeds some uniform amount "￿. There are no rank





￿ (n + 1)g (n) +
X
t￿i;￿
￿i (ti)[t￿i;￿]h(￿) 6= 0
for all i and ti 2 Ti.
33Proposition 13 If separable-symmetric payo⁄s, limit dominance, constant
common rank beliefs of strategic types, uniform separation, no rank ties and
no common rank payo⁄ ties satis￿ed, then dominance solvability holds. If r￿
is the common rank belief held by all strategic types, action 1 is the unique




￿ (n + 1)g (n) +
X
t￿i;￿
￿i (ti)[t￿i;￿]h(￿) > 0;




￿ (n + 1)g (n) +
X
t￿i;￿
￿i (ti)[t￿i;￿]h(￿) < 0.
We can paraphrase our result as: Common certainty of common rank
beliefs for strategic types implies dominance solvability, where "common cer-
tainty" denotes "common 1-belief," which is often described as common
knowledge in the economics literature.
Proof. Limit dominance implies that there exists a player j and type tj such
that







[t￿j;￿]h(￿) > 0. (11)
Now for each i,
￿
ti 2 Ti






























































S￿￿k (?) is the set of types of player i such that his unique kth level
rationalizable action is to play 1. For k = 0, the claim follows from (11) and




￿ (n + 1)g (n)+
X
t￿i;￿




￿ (n + 1)g (n)￿g (0)￿"
￿k > 0.
(14)







S￿￿k (?); (14) implies that ti does not have a dominant strategy ac-
tion to play action 0. If ti does not have a dominant strategy, then common
rank beliefs implies ￿i (ti) = r￿. Type ti is certain (by uniform separation





S￿￿k￿1 (?) and therefore have a unique (k ￿ 1)th rationalizable action























￿ (n + 1)g (n) +
X
t￿i;￿











= fti 2 Ti jRi (￿;ti) = f1gg.










￿ (n + 1)g (n) +
X
t￿i;￿












= fti 2 Ti jRi (￿;ti) = f0gg.










￿ (n + 1)g (n) +
X
t￿i;￿





We brie￿ y report two simple weakenings of the common rank beliefs under
which the result will continue to hold.
First, consider the ￿rst order stochastic dominance order on rank beliefs,








Say that there is decreasing common rank beliefs if, for any ti 2 Ti and
tj 2 Tj,
ti ￿ tj ) ￿i (ti) E ￿j (tj)
Now if we replaced the assumption of common and constant rank beliefs of
strategic types with common and decreasing rank beliefs of strategic types,
we would again have dominance solvability. In particular, action 1 (0) would
be the unique rationalizable action if
I￿1 X
n=0
￿i (ti)[n + 1] +
X
t￿i;￿
￿i (ti)[t￿i;￿]h(￿) > ( < )0.
Second, suppose that rank beliefs were not constant but that they did
not change too fast relative to the expectations of fundamentals. Let
￿ = g (I ￿ 1) ￿ g (0)
36measure the strategic sensitivity of the game. Write ￿(r;r0) for the distance
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￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
.
Now if we replaced the assumption of common and constant rank beliefs of
strategic types with near constant common rank beliefs of strategic types, we
would again have dominance solvability. Morris and Shin (2005) describe
a uniqueness result using this idea (where the near constant rank beliefs
is delivered by "bounded marginals on di⁄erences" property. Mason and
Valentinyi (2006) also used a related idea.
5.2 Common Certainty of Beliefs in Di⁄erences
We now present a second set of su¢ cient conditions for uniqueness that
allows for asymmetry across players. Payo⁄s ￿ are separable if there exist
increasing functions ￿
1
i : 2I=fig ! R and ￿
2
i : ￿ ! R such that
￿i (Z;￿) = ￿
1
i (Z) + ￿
2
i (￿)
The type space of each player is two-dimensional. A type has two compo-
nents. The ￿rst component is completely ordered and we identify it with
the set of integers Z. The second component is any ￿nite set ￿i. Thus, for
each i, we have a bijection
gi : Ti ! Z ￿ ￿i.
37The ￿rst component of a type can be interpreted as a signal received about
the fundamentals ￿, so that higher ￿rst components are associated with
higher beliefs about ￿. The second component is some other dimension
along which players vary. However, note that the ordering applies only to
the types of a single player, whereas the condition of common certainty of
rank beliefs applied the ordering to the union of all types, and so we were
ranking across players, also.
We now introduce our assumptions. Denote by gi1 (ti) the ￿rst compo-
nent of gi (ti).
Assumption (Uniform Monotonicity): There exists " > 0 such that













i (￿) + "
for all i, ti, t0
i.




















i (￿) > 0.
Assumption (￿-Di⁄use Beliefs): There exists ￿ > 0 such that, for each i
and, for each j 6= i, hj : ￿j ! Z,
X
ft￿i:gj1(tj)=hj(gj2(tj)) for some jg;￿
￿i (ti)[t￿i;￿] < ￿
The last assumption and the uniformity requirement in the ￿rst as-
sumption can be thought of as technical assumptions: they are required
38only because we are allowing for discrete type spaces and are not re-
quired (or are implicit) in the standard continuous signals global games
framework.
Finally, we come to our key de￿nition. De￿ne player i￿ s beliefs about




























gi1 (ti) + ￿j; j
￿
is the type of player j whose ￿rst component is gi1 (ti)+￿j, and whose second
component is  j. Thus, type ti￿ s beliefs about di⁄erences are ti￿ s beliefs over
other players￿types where player j￿ s type is distance ￿j away along the ￿rst
component.
Our su¢ cient condition for uniqueness rests on the beliefs about di⁄er-
ences being insensitive to the ranking of a particular player￿ s type. In other
words, the function ￿i de￿ned in (15) is a constant function with respect to
the ￿rst component of a player￿ s type.
Proposition 14 Assume uniform monotonicity and limit dominance. Then
there exists ￿ > 0 such that, if ￿ ￿ ￿ and there are ￿-di⁄use beliefs, then
common certainty of beliefs in di⁄erences implies dominance solvability.
Proof. Figure 5 illustrates the argument. For each k = 0;1;:::, there
exists h
k
i : ￿i ! Z and non-increasing h
k
i : ￿i ! Z such that h
k
i ( i) is
non-decreasing in k for each  i, h
k
i ( i) is non-increasing in k for each  i,
1 2 R
k
i (￿;ti) if and only if gi1 (ti) ￿ h
k
i (gi2 (ti))
and 0 2 R
k
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This can be proved by standard monotone methods, see, e.g., van Zandt and




i : ￿i ! Z such that h
￿
i ( i) ￿ h
￿
i ( i)
for all  i 2 ￿i and
1 2 R
￿
i (￿;ti) if and only if gi1 (ti) ￿ h
￿
i (gi2 (ti)) (16)
and 0 2 R
￿
i (￿;ti) if and only if gi1 (ti) ￿ h
￿
i (gi2 (ti))




i (and then proving
a contradiction). Let c be the smallest integer such that h
￿
i ( i) ￿ h
￿
i ( i)+c
















































































i) + c; 
￿
i) and believes this his
opponents are choosing action 1 if and only if gj1 (tj) ￿ h
￿
j (gj2 (tj))+c. Then



















j : gj1 (tj) ￿ h
￿

























These are the payo⁄s from the strategic part of the payo⁄ function that de-
pends on the actions of others. On the other hand, the part of the payo⁄




































i (￿) + c"






















j : gj1 (tj) ￿ h
￿


























j : gj1 (tj) ￿ h
￿








unless gj1 (tj) = h
￿










































j : gj1 (tj) ￿ h
￿

















































































This proof appeals to the "translation" argument of contradiction of
Frankel, Morris and Pauzner (FMP) (2003). In FMP, there were one di-
mensional continuous types but many (countable or continuum) actions for
each player. Here we have a binary action game, but allow multidimen-
sional discrete signals and not restricting to the standard noisy information
structure of global games. Oury (2005) gives results for multidimensional
global games (with multidimensional actions and signals) in the standard
noise framework. In the next section, we present a simple example of mul-
tidimensional signal binary action game with continuous signals.
6 Multidimensional Example
Global game applications have typically focussed on games that are symmet-
ric across players with one dimensional signals. Here, we sketch a simple
example that is asymmetric across players and allows for multiple dimen-
sional signals. It thus illustrates how the logic of proposition 14 could be
42useful in applications. For simplicity, we simply present a continuous signals
example. At some cost of tractability, we could discretize the example so
that 14 applied.
Two players must decide whether to "invest" or "not invest". The cost
of investing is either p or p, where 0 < p < p < 1. Player i is high cost
with probability ￿i. The return to investing is 1 if (i) ￿ > ￿ or (ii) if ￿ ￿ ￿
and the other player invests; otherwise the return to investing is 0. Let ￿ be
uniformly distributed on the real line. Player i observes a signal xi = ￿+"i,
where each "i is independently distributed with full support density f. Thus





f ("1)f ("1 ￿ ￿)d"1
Write H for the corresponding c.d.f. Assume that ￿ < ￿ and that ￿ ￿ ￿
is very large.
A pure strategy for player i is a pair si = (si;si), where si;si : R !finvest,not investg




i) threshold strategy for player i if
si (xi) =
￿
invest, if xi ￿ x￿
i





invest, if xi ￿ x￿
i
not invest, if xi < x￿
i
Proposition 15 There is an essentially unique equilibrium of this game in




















player i does not invest xi ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.





where there are multiple equilibria under complete
information.







2), with ￿ ￿ x￿
i ￿ x￿
i ￿ ￿ such
that the best response to the strategy pro￿le is to invest more. Then the
action "invest" will infect the intermediate region. Does there exist such a
threshold strategy pro￿le? Assume speci￿cally that the expected payo⁄ to
investing for the marginal signal is c. Then we must have:








1) ￿ p = c








1) ￿ p = c








2) ￿ p = c








2) ￿ p = c
Now substitute in that
Pr
￿
xj ￿ b x
￿






xi ￿ xj = "i ￿ "j ￿ b x
￿
















































1) ￿ p = c (20)
44Now observe that since h is symmetric by construction, H (￿x) = 1￿H (x).
Thus (19) and (20) can be re-written as








2)) ￿ p = c (21)








2)) ￿ p = c (22)
Now multiplying equations (17), (18), (21) and (22) by 1￿￿1;￿1;1￿￿2 and
￿2 respectively, we get:

















2) ￿ ￿1p = ￿1c (24)








2)) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)p = (1 ￿ ￿2)c (25)








2)) ￿ ￿2p = ￿2c (26)





























Thus for any H, investment invades if and only if the average expected cost
of investment is at most 1
2.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper has aimed at achieving the following objectives. First, we have
presented a global game analysis where we dispense with talk of ￿noisy sig-
nals￿ , and instead deal with type spaces directly. Second, with our frame-
work, we have been able to characterize the higher-order beliefs that allow
the global game argument to ￿work￿ . Essentially, the property that matters
45is the stationarity of beliefs with respect to the ordering of types in the region
where the players do not have dominant actions. Finally, by characteriz-
ing the beliefs and higher order beliefs that are necessary and su¢ cient for
an action to be rationalizable, we have shed light on precisely what kind of
departure from common knowledge is underpinning play in global games.
By focusing on the underlying belief foundations as the basis for play in
global games, we have taken a step away from the practice of identifying the
global game approach as being tied to a particular formalism of noisy signals
with public and private information. To the extent that multiplicity is
restored in some cases, it is because one or more of the stationarity of beliefs
with respect to types is violated. Reorienting the questions in this way tells
us whether the particular context is a plausible setting for analysis. The
new perspective can therefore be illuminating in helping applied researchers
to settle questions of when uniqueness may be a reasonable outcome.
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